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PROLIFERATION THREATS AND SOLUTIONSt
JOSEPH CIRINCIONE*
I was just in Berlin very recently, meeting with senior minis-
try officials and some of the best experts in Europe on prolifera-
tion strategy. One of the German officials said to me, "You know
what we hear from America? All we hear is 'Be afraid."' The
U.S. warnings of imminent danger do not resonate across the
oceans. Europeans do not see the problems the same way we do.
We look at Iran and see a threat that has to be confronted; they
see a problem that has to be managed. They see terrorism as a
serious problem, but not as the overwhelming, terrifying threat
we believe it to be. As much as I disagree with some of the
administration's policies, I am basically in agreement that we
have a very serious problem with terrorism that we must con-
front. I agree with Dale Watson: we have to be on the offensive
in this strategy because there are evil men out there who want to
kill us. I firmly believe that nuclear terrorism is our number one
security threat. If the terrorists get a nuclear device, they will use
it.
We know that terrorists have been trying to get a nuclear
device. The 9/11 Commission Report,1 for example, documented
efforts by Usama bin Laden to buy a significant quantity of highly
enriched uranium-the core material for an atomic bomb. They
bought what they thought was highly enriched uranium for one
and one-half million dollars, though it turned out to be a scam.
Clearly, they are looking for nuclear options.
I. NUCLFAR TIPPING POINT
The United States faces four primary nuclear threats, any
one of which could tip over into a crisis in the next couple of
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years. The decisions we make in the near future will determine
whether we are able to contain the dangers, or whether we tip
over into a dangerous nuclear confrontation. The first and most
serious nuclear threat is that of nuclear terrorism. It is a new
danger that arises from the confluence of twenty-seven thousand
nuclear weapons stockpiled in the world, hundreds of tons of
highly enriched uranium and plutonium outside of the nuclear
weapons stockpiles, and the rise of messianic groups whose
intent is not to attract attention to their cause, not to make a
political point, but to cause catastrophic or apocalyptic damage.
Usama bin Laden wants to trigger a holyjihad; he wants a con-
frontation between the West and the Muslim world. Aum
Shinrikyo thought, as they spread sarin nerve gas through the
Tokyo subway system, that they were going to trigger an apoca-
lyptic moment which would bring about a new nirvana in the
world. These groups are not just evil, they are crazy. Now they
may want to cause mass destruction through nuclear weapons.
While states with territory and national futures can be deterred
from using what weapon they have, terrorists cannot be deterred.
These factors make terrorism the most significant nuclear threat
we face. However, it is not the only nuclear threat.
We also face the threat of new nuclear weapons states, specif-
ically, Iran and North Korea. Fortunately, the list of countries
pursuing weapons is short. How we handle these countries in the
very near term will decide our future for decades to come. How
we conduct our relations with the Iranians over the next year will
determine whether we can dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons. The same is true for North Korea. To be clear: the
danger is not that Iran or North Korea will build a nuclear
weapon and then attack us. No, deterrence is alive and well.
They understand very well what would happen immediately after
such an attack even if we simply suspected that the attack came
from them. For example, if they launched a nuclear-armed mis-
sile, we would know within tens of seconds and within tens of
meters exactly where the attack originated. Consequently, a
nuclear missile attack is the least of our worries; it is the least
likely delivery vehicle that these countries would use.
Likewise, we should also not be very concerned that Iran or
North Korea would intentionally transfer a nuclear weapon to a
terrorist group. No country has ever given a chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapon to a group they could not control. Such an
action would risk the possibility that the terrorist group might
use the weapon against the country of origin or that there might
be blowback from radiation or diseases back into the country.
Most importantly, the country still risks retaliation by any target,
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such as the United States, that could discern the original source
of the weapon.
The primary danger to the United States and the world from
the emergence of new nuclear states is the regional instability
that will likely result. If Iran becomes a nuclear state, other states
in the region will, for their own geo-political reasons, feel like
they have to match the nuclear weapon capability in kind. For
example, Egypt might restart the nuclear program that it had in
the 1960s. Saudi Arabia, who heavily financed Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program, might use their influence in Pakistan and
invite Pakistan to station nuclear weapons on Saudi territory.
Turkey would consider their nuclear options. A new government
in Iraq, if there is a stable government in Iraq at that point,
might consider restarting Iraq's nuclear effort. In sum, there
would be a chain reaction throughout the region surrounding a
new nuclear state. Suddenly, a Middle East with one nuclear
power-Israel-would become a region of two, three, or four
nuclear powers. This scenario, in combination with existing
unresolved tensions, political disputes, and territorial and relig-
ious disputes, would be a recipe for nuclear war.
The third danger the United States faces is the danger from
existing arsenals of nuclear weapons. There are about twenty-
eight thousand nuclear weapons in the world. The United States
has ten thousand, Russia has seventeen thousand. When one
speaks about nuclear weapons, and, for that matter, chemical
weapons, one has to realize that these two countries hold the
bulk of the weapons. Moreover, the United States and Russia are
still in a Cold War nuclear posture. Both countries still have
thousands of nuclear warheads on hair-trigger nuclear alert,
ready to launch within fifteen minutes notice. This posture
increases the chance of unauthorized launch, accidental launch,
or failure of the Russian early warning system. For example, sev-
eral years ago, Russia thought a routine launch of a Norwegian
weather rocket was actually an ICBM. They could not read it
accurately because their early warning system is decaying: it is a
shadow of what it once was. For the first time in history, Russia
came perilously close to actually launching a retaliatory strike-
and this was after the Cold War had officially ended. For the first
time, a Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, had open in front of him
the nuclear suitcase. One push of a button would have launched
the weapon. Fortunately, they decided it could not possibly be
the United States attacking Russia, so they closed the suitcase and
backed off. They found out the truth a few minutes later-but a
repeat of that situation is all too possible, perhaps when relations
are not as cordial or not as trusting. We have to do more to take
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the Cold War weapons off alert and to eliminate them. U.S. and
Russian deployment of thousands of nuclear weapons no longer
serve any conceivable military mission.
The fourth danger the United States faces is a diplomatic
danger: the collapse of the existing arms proliferation regime,
that network of treaties, agreements, and arrangements that have
been in place for the last fifty years. This has the potential to
become the most perilous of the dangers. Republicans and Dem-
ocrats, conservatives and liberals, worked together over the past
decades to slow, if not prevent altogether, the spread of nuclear
weapons. Forty-four years ago, in the 1960 presidential debate,
young Senator John Kennedy challenged Vice President Richard
Nixon. Attacking him from the right, he said that the Eisen-
hower administration had not done enough to protect the
national security of the United States and that Eisenhower
should have concluded a comprehensive nuclear test ban and
stopped atmospheric nuclear tests. If the United States failed to
act, he said, the four nuclear nations that then existed, the
United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France (which had deto-
nated a bomb in 1960), could mushroom into fifteen, twenty, or
twenty-five nuclear nations. Kennedy was not worried about
rogue states. No, he was worried about existing industrially
developed countries that possessed the capability to build weap-
ons, and were actually pursuing, or considering, nuclear weapons
programs of their own. Sweden had a program for nuclear weap-
ons. Switzerland was considering a program. Germany and
Japan had politicians advocating nuclear weapons programs.
Remember, this was fifteen years after World War II. The idea of
Germany and Japan obtaining nuclear weapons was not particu-
larly comforting, even though they were U.S. allies. Fortunately,
Kennedy acted, beginning negotiations for the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. He could not finish the job. President Johnson com-
pleted the negotiations, with President Nixon signing the treaty,
putting the framework in place.
Specifically, the Treaty said that the five countries with
nuclear weapons (China had joined the club by then) would
reduce their arsenals, eventually eliminating them. The other
signatories promised not to pursue nuclear weapons. Overall,
the deal has held fairly well. The world has averaged one new
member of the nuclear club every decade: Israel developed
nuclear weapons in secret in 1968, and now has an arsenal of
about one hundred nuclear weapons; Pakistan and India were
secretly working on and tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Conse-
quently, the world now has eight nuclear states, with North Korea
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possibly in possession of a nuclear weapon and Iran knocking on
the door.
In essence, the treaty will only survive if countries believe in
the pyramid scheme of non-proliferation. Like a con artist's
scam, the regime only works if people keep investing in it. With-
out faith in this regime, countries will reconsider their nuclear
options-and there are two to three dozen countries that could
build nuclear weapons quickly but have made the political deci-
sion not to do so. Japan, for example, could have a nuclear
weapon within thirty days. They have the material, they have the
know-how, they may even have a design.
The dangers of nuclear terrorism, regional arms races
fueled by new nuclear states and unresolved disputes, huge
nuclear stockpiles on alert, and the collapse of the non-prolifera-
tion framework are the greatest nuclear threats facing the United
States and the world. It is like playing four-dimensional chess.
The United States has to deal on all of these levels at once-to
move multiple pieces at once, keeping in mind that a move on
one level affects the move on another. For example, if we cannot
contain Iran, Iran will add another nuclear stockpile subject to
the risk of terrorist theft, and trigger a ripple effect in the Middle
East encouraging the creation of additional nuclear states and
stockpiles, likely resulting in the collapse of the non-proliferation
regime and a halt in reductions in the arsenals of the United
States and Russia.
II. NUCLEAR SOLUTIONS
What is the current policy for dealing with this? For years,
after the Cold War ended officials and experts saw the threat as
"the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."
They saw the weapons themselves as the problem, as we had since
John F. Kennedy's era. As long as these weapons existed, some-
body would use them. As Kennedy said, "We must abolish the
weapons of war before they abolish us." Richard Nixon led the
way on biological weapons, unilaterally destroying the U.S. stock-
pile of thousands of bio-weapons and negotiated a treaty to elimi-
nate them world wide. Today, very few countries play around
with biological weapons, but they are still serious threats. George
H.W. Bush led the way on chemical weapons, negotiating a
chemical weapons convention to rid the world of these deadly
arsenals. Very few countries have chemical weapons now, but a
handful still hold stockpiles. Most of these countries are in the
Middle East. It is time to get rid of the weapons.
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The idea is the same with nuclear non-proliferation, which
has worked to limit the threat of nuclear weapons. Arsenals are
coming down. There are about half as many nuclear weapons in
the world now as there were fifteen years ago. There are fewer
countries pursuing these weapons, and there are fewer countries
contemplating weapon programs.
George W. Bush came into office with a radically different
formula. In his 2002 State of the Union speech, he said that the
danger is "outlaw regimes with nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons." In other words, it is not the weapons, but who has the
weapons. He changed the issue from "what" to "who." Then we
start picking and choosing-it is okay that India has nuclear
weapons, but it is not okay that Iraq has nuclear weapons. It is
okay that Israel has nuclear weapons, but it is not okay that Iran
has nuclear weapons. It is okay that we have nuclear weapons,
but it is not okay that North Korea has nuclear weapons. The
strategy becomes not eliminating the weapons, but eliminating
the regimes. The logic is to go to the source of the problem and
knock off the "whom." Why? Because we can. We have the phys-
ical military capability. We are going to stop this threat with pre-
emptive action before it develops.
It was this strategy that led directly to the Iraq War. Moreo-
ver, the Iraq War is supposed to be the model. It is supposed to
be a message to Iran and North Korea. It is supposed to be a
warning that if you pursue these programs, we are going to come
after you, and we are going to kill you. There are costs to pursu-
ing these programs, so do not pursue the programs.
Now we get to the problem. The strategy has backfired.
The strategy, which looked so attractive, which we thought was
going to be so effective, has been very, very costly. One thou-
sand, one hundred thirteen Americans have died in the war
before the Fallujah offensive. It has cost two hundred billion dol-
lars. We have fractured alliances. We have increased animosity
throughout the Muslim world. We have the worst reputation we
have ever had in our history with the Arab nations. This is a very
costly strategy. It makes it more difficult to pursue the war on
terrorism, more difficult to forge joint operations against terror-
ism and proliferation. What is more, the Iranian and North
Korean programs have accelerated-they have advanced in the
last four years, and particularly in the last two years, not
contracted.
A key part of the problem is bad math. It is extremely
important that threat assessments are accurate. The math that
the administration used, as the President has said, concluded
that the nexus of greatest danger comes at the intersection of
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terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and outlaw states. At first
that seemed to make a lot of sense, and maybe you still think it
makes sense. Most dangerous people, plus most dangerous
weapons, plus most dangerous states must equal the greatest
threat.
However, if you are Usama bin Laden, and you want nuclear
weapons, where do you go? You do not go to Iran-it does not
have nuclear weapons. You do not go to Iraq, we know they do
not have nuclear weapons. Usama can not even go to North
Korea because they are not going to give him nuclear weapons.
Where do you go? You take a lesson from Willie Suttom, the
1930's bank robber. Willie was asked why he robbed banks?
Because, he said, that's where the money is. Where are the
nuclear weapons? The nuclear weapons are in Russia-and in
any state stockpile that is vulnerable to threat or diversion, partic-
ularly Pakistan's. If you are worried about Usama bin Laden get-
ting a nuclear weapon, you have to worry about the seventeen
thousand nuclear weapons, some of which are in very insecure
storage in Russia, and the hundreds of tons of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium, some of which are stored in facilities
that are protected literally by a fence, a padlock, and a guard that
works days. If you want to stop nuclear terrorism you have to get
to those materials, to work with the host nations to get rid of
them, or secure them before Usama bin Laden can get his evil
hands on them. As former Senator Sam Nunn says, we are in a
race between cooperation and catastrophe. It is the race of our
lives.
We have government programs in place that can do this,
and we have been working on it for the past ten years. They are
called the Nunn-Lugar programs. The approach is to eliminate
the stockpiles, and we have made tremendous progress. In ten
years, forty percent of the stockpiles are now secure. That, my
friends, is not good enough. Sam Nunn, in his great Southern
way, says a gazelle fleeing a cheetah is taking a step in the right
direction. However, it is not a question of direction; it is a ques-
tion of speed. We are not moving fast enough.
One of the debating points in the 2004 Presidential Election
was thatJohn Kerry said he was going to get the job done in the
next four years, not in the next ten years as currently planned.
The current administration is still piddling along with budgets of
about one billion dollars a year on these programs. Kerry said he
would triple that amount. More than that, there are these stock-
piles of nuclear material out there in reactors in about forty
other nations. People have civilian research reactors that the
Russians and we sold them during the 1950's and 1960's that use
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highly enriched uranium. The fuel is ideal for terrorist use-you
can simply take it and put it in a bomb.
The hardest thing for a terrorist to do in constructing a
nuclear weapon is getting the material. Every step after that is
easier for them and harder for us to stop. The designs are well
known. If they can get the material, either a softball sized chunk
of highly enriched uranium, twenty-five kilograms, or about four
or five kilograms of plutonium, the designs are pretty well
known. There is enough technology, and there are enough
scientists on the market that they can bribe or coerce to help.
Once they put it in a package, delivery is easy. As Kerry said dur-
ing the campaign, most of our cargo is not inspected when it
comes into this country. All you need to do is put it on a cargo
ship heading into lower Manhattan, and way before it gets to cus-
toms you can detonate the device.
The answer is to go secure that material. Here is the good
news. I think this administration is now seriously interested in
pursuing the material. They have not done it in the last two
years, but there are a lot of indications that I see that they are
interested in speeding up, and putting more money into these
programs. The administration recently started a program called
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to bring this fuel back to
the countries of origin and to convert the reactors to low
enriched uranium that cannot be used in bombs. That is one of
the initiatives that I personally will be working to accelerate over
the next year, and that is one of the steps we advocate in a strat-
egy document entitled Universal Compliance.' We will be talking
with the administration intensely over the next few months to try
to convince our government officials to put more money into
these kinds of programs. The best way to stop nuclear terrorists
is to stop them from getting the material in the first place.
There's a lot more-I am going to close my remarks out
here because I am out of time. If you are interested, please go to
our website to download and view the final Carnegie report. You
can also get the latest news and resources at the site, just go to
ProliferationNews.org. Stay involved, stay informed. I'm happy
to talk to you more about this, and I look forward to your ques-
tions and the discussion period to follow.
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